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Articles
WILLIAMS

v. STATE:

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY AND NECESSITY
OF SODOMY LAWS

by Janet M. LaRue and Rory K. Nugent
I. INTRODUCTION
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest
to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made
constitutional law having little or no cognizable
roots in the language or design of the
Constitution.)
Although Justice White's words of admonition may
have been intended for the Supreme Court alone, they
succinctly defme for all of us the role ofthe judiciary in a
three-branched system of government. 2 The message is
clear: state courts, with no inherent powers to create public
policy, undermine their viability when they pull
jurisprudential rabbits out of hats and fashion new rights
from their respective state constitutions. In Bowers v.
HardWick, the United States Supreme Court expressed
that it had dealt sufficiently with "emanating penumbras"
and meticulous historical analysis, and declined to create
a federal constitutional right to engage in homosexual
sodomy based on such analysis. 3 However, in Williams
v. State,4 the Circuit Court for Baltimore City recently
delved into issue with dangerous consequences.
Despite the weak legal foundation of the Williams
case, the circuit court found that a valid law, which served
as a necessary means of protecting public health and
morality, did not apply to private, consensual, noncommercial sexual activity. 5 It is well recognized that the
states have broad powers to legislate with regard to these
I Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,194 (1986) (finding no constitutional
right to engage in homosexual behavior).

2

See id. at 194-95.

3

See id.

No. 980360311CC-1 059, 1998 Extra LEXIS 260 (Balt. City Cir. Ct.
Oct. 15, 1998) (holding that Article 27, sections 553 and 554 of the
Annotated Code of Maryland do not apply to consensual, noncommercial, private sexual activities).
.
4

S

See id.
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matters. 6 Sodomy laws prohibit conduct deemed to be
immoral by the state and protect the public from disease
and infection. These concerns represent legitimate state
interests and the judiciary should maintain a high burden
of proof for those seeking to overturn the law.
This article will demonstrate how the Maryland courts
have ignored precedent and rewritten valid legislation in
an attempt to "keep up with the Joneses" during the
nationwide frenzy of invalidating state sodomy statutes.7
The circuit court's decision in Williams exemplifies the
judicial fiat that now represents legal reasoning in the court
system.

II. WILLIAMS V. STATE
In Williams v. State, six individuals challenged the
validity of Article 27, section 554 ofthe Annotated Code
of Maryland. 8 Article 27, section 554 criminalizes
sodomy, whether oral or anal, as an unnatural and

6

See U.S. CONST. amend. X.

See Gryczan v. State of Montana, 283 Mont. 433, 942 P.2d 112 (1997);
Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S. W.2d 250 (Tenn. 1996); Commonwealth
v. Wasson, No. 90-SC-588-TG, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992); State v.
Morales, No. 3-91-195, 826 S.W. 2d 201 (Tx. Ap. 1992). Bule! Miller
v. State, No. 91-KA-00057, 636 S.2d. 391 (Miss. 1994); State v. Walsh,
No. 67465, 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986). The court cites these cases as
examples of states that have upheld their laws prohibiting sodomy and
similar conduct. One of the cases cited by the court as affirming their
anti-sodomy law, Christensen v. State, 266 Ga. 474, 468 S.E.2d 188
(1996), has since been overtumed. See Powell v. State, 270 Ga 327, 510
S.E.2d 18 (1998).
7

8

MD. ANN. CODE art 27, § 554 (1998). Section 554 reads as follows:
Every person who is convicted of taking into his or her
mouth the sexual organ of any other person or animal, or
who shall be convicted of placing his or her sexual organ in
the mouth of any other person or animal, or who shall be
convicted of committing any other unnatural or perverted
sexual practice with any other person or animal, shall be
fined not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), or
be imprisoned in jail or in the house of correction or in the
penitentiary for a period not exceeding ten years, or shall
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perverted practice. 9 Four of the plaintiffs, Williams
included, were members of the Maryland Bar. lo Each
alleged that the existence of the statute placed them in
constant fear ofarrest and subsequent prosecution. I I They
argued that as a result of this fear, they had suffered
psychological injury and real or potential pecuniary
damages. 12 Only one of the plaintiffs, Doe, had been
arrested on a related crime of solicitation for attempting to
engage in homosexual conduct with an undercover police
officer. \3 Doe argued that ifsection 554 does not prohibit
consensual, non-commercial, private homosexual conduct,
then solicitation of such conduct should not be illegal. 14
However, the court upheld the solicitation statute, noting
that unlike the actual conduct, "an unwanted solicitation is
neither private nor consensual."15
The sixth plaintiff, who joined only as a taxpayer,
asserted that state funds should not have been "wasted"
in enforcing the sodomy statute. 16
The court first noted that in order to seek a declaratoty
judgment, ajusticiable controversy must exist. 17 Ironically,
the State argued that there was no justiciable issue since
the statute is not enforced as to either heterosexuals or
homosexuals as long as the conduct is consensual,
noncommercial, and private. 18 The court rejected the
argument, observing that present and future State's
Attorneys may interpret the statute differently.19 Therefore,
the court concluded that the plaintiffs had a legitimate fear

be both fined and imprisoned within the limits above
prescribed in the discretion of the court.
9

of prosecution and that this fear constituted a justiciable
controversy .20

III. THE "JUMPING OFF POINT":
SCHOCHET V. STATE
The Williams court analyzed the alleged constitutional
issues by first aclmowledging that the ')umping offpoint"
for the plaintiffs was Schochet v. State. 21 The defendant
in Schochet was charged with seven counts of rape, as
well as fellatio in violation of section 554. 22 The State
failed to establish that the sexual activity was nonconsensual and ajury subsequently acquitted the defendant
ofthe rape charges. 23 However, the jury returned a guilty
verdict on the fellatio charge. 24 The court of special
appeals affirmed, holding that there was "no constitutional
protection for sexual activity - orthodox or unorthodox,
heterosexual or homosexual - at least outside of
marriage.''25 The Court ofAppeals of Maryland reversed
the ruling below after considering two issues: (1) whether
Article 27 section 554 encompasses "consensual,
noncommercial, heterosexual activity between adults in the
privacy of home," and if so, (2) whether it violates either
the Constitution of the United States or the Maryland
Declaration ofRights. 26
The Schochet court began its opinion by reviewing
the canon of construction which demands that "if a
legislative act is susceptible of two reasonable
interpretations, one ofwhich would not involve a decision
as to the constitutionality ofthe act while the other would,
the construction which avoids the determination of

See id.

10

See Williams, at *1-2.

II

See id.

12

See id.

20

See id.

13

See id.

21

320 Md. 714, 580 A.2d 176 (1990).

14

See id. at *14.

22

See id. at 717, 580 A.2d at 178.

IS

See id. at *15.

23

See id. at 725,580 A.2d at 181.

16

See id. at *2.

24

See id. at 723,580 A.2d at 180.

17

See id. at *4.

2S

18

See id. at *5.

Id. (quoting Schochet v. State, 75 Md. App. 314, 339 (1988». The
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland "[r]eject[ed] the argument that
Schochet's conviction violated a federal constitutional right to privacy."

19

See id. at *9.

26

See id. at 717,580 A.2d at 177.

29.2 U. Bait. L.F. 7
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constitutionality is to be preferred."27 In order to avoid an
unconstitutional interpretation of the statute, the court of
appeals construed the statute narrowly and chose not to
include within its scope "noncommercial, heterosexual
activity between consenting adults in the privacy of the
home,"28 thereby creating the exception upon which
Williams was based. 29
Despite the good intentions of the judiciary,
Schochet, like Williams, is an example of an unbridled
court system. As the State argued in Schochet, the
interpretation that created the exception can hardly be said
to be a "reasonable" interpretation of the statute. 30 The
legislature in section 554 does not make a distinction
between consensual and nonconsensual, public and
private, commercial and noncommercial, or most
importantly, heterosexual and homosexual activity.31
Nonetheless, the Schochet court held that to give effect
to the statute's broad language would raise questions as
to its overall constitutionaIity.32 In support ofthis reasoning,
the court cited the split amongst the states concerning
whether such conduct could be prohibited by legislative
enactment.33

27Id. at 725,580 A.2d at 181 (quoting Heilman Brewing v. Stroh Brewery,
308 Md. 746, 763-764 (1987)).

The court then catalogued all of the Maryland
decisions considering section 554. 34 Because no
consensual, non commercial, heterosexual conduct had
been prosecuted under section 554, the court found that
this type of conduct was not within the contemplation of
the drafters ofsection 554, and therefore, was not included
within its application.35 After this lengthy review, the court
decided to rewrite the statute, rather than give effect to
the intent ofthe Maryland legislature.
The decision of the court in Schochet simply does
not follow logical reasoning. The Supreme Court has not
yet overruled Bowers;36 therefore, it is inconsequential to
Maryland courts how other state tribunals have ruled on
similar statues in relation to application oftheir respective
state constitutions.3' The only issue that need be
considered by a Maryland court is the law passed by the
Maryland legislature and its applicability to the Maryland
constitution. The Schochetcourt, however, fails to mention
the Maryland constitution or discuss its application to the
issue at bar. 38 Unfortunately, the court in Williams follows
the same course ofambitious adjudication as demonstrated
by the Schochet COurt. 39
The court of appeals in Schochet also rejected the
argument forwarded by the State based on the legislative
history surrounding section 554.40 The Maryland General
Assembly proposed an amendment to a bill dividing rape
into fIrst and second degrees, thus effectively repealing
sections 553 and 554.41 The report from the Maryland
Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee commented that
sections 553 and 554 should be repealed, as offenses

28Id. at 731, 580 A.2d at 184.
See Williams, at *13. The plaintiffs in Williams questioned why
consensual, noncommercial, heterosexual activity, excluded by section
554, should apply to homosexual activity in similar circumstances.

29

30

See id. at 729, at 580 A.2d 183.

See id. at 731,580 A.2d 184-85. The court categorized the cases into
three types: (1) those that involved homosexual activity, (2) those that
involved minors, and (3) those that involved a violation in a public place.
See id.

31

See id.; see also, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 554 (1998).

35

See id. at 733,580 A.2d at 185.

32

See id. at 731, 580 A.2d at 184.

36

See Bowers, 478 U.S. 186.

37

See id. at 194-95.

38

See Schochet, 320 Md. at 714, 580 A.2d at 176.

39

See id. at 714, 580 A.2d 176.

40

See id. at 734, 580 A.2d at 186.

See id. at 726,580 A.2d at 182. The court looked to People v. Onofre.
51 N.Y.2d 476, 488, 415 N.E.2d 936, 940-41, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947, 951
(1980) (holding as unconstitutional the invasion of privacy to attempt
to regulate, through use of criminal penalty, consensual oral sex between
persons of the opposite sex). The court also cited Commonwealth v.
Balthazaar, 366 Mass. 298, 318 N.E. 478 (1974) (interpreting statute
narrowly so as to avoid constitutional issue as to whether consensual
oral sex, in private, between members of the opposite sex, can be
proscribed by statute).

33

29.2 U. Bait L.F. 8

34

See id. at 733,580 A.2d at 186 (citing Pitcher, Rape and Other Sexual
Offense Law Reform In Maryland, 7 U. BALT. L. REv 151 (1977)).

41
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under these sections were rarely prosecuted.42 However,
when the bill was finally enacted it had been amended so
as not to repeal the statutes at issue.43 The State, therefore,
posited that because these sections were not repealed,
the legislature intended sections 553 and 554 to apply to
consensual, noncommercial heterosexual activity.44 The
court found this argument "unpersuasive," and declared
that the General Assembly "may have decided that
consensual homosexual acts should still be prohibited."45
This statement by the court of appeals appears to indicate
that the judiciary anticipated no equal protection problem
in applying section 554 to homosexuals but not to
heterosexuals. Nevertheless, the Williams court disagreed,
finding that section 554 violated the equal protection rights
of an individual.46
It is often said that "hard cases make bad law." In
light of Schochet and the circuit court's expansion ofthat
case, it may well be said that bad law will only make more
hard cases. The reconstruction of section 55447 by the
Schochet court has led the Williams court to also conduct
an ad hoc exercise ofjudicial will, rather than a consistent
and prudent exercise ofjudicial reasoning. The Court of
Appeals ofMaryland attempted to avoid a constitutional
privacy issue by creating a potential equal protection
issue;48 the Williams decision attempted to address the
equal protection problem and rendered a legislative
enactment meaningless.49 Schochet certainly provides a
')umping off point" on the issue. The concern though, is
where we will land.

See id. at 733-34, 580 A.2d at 186 (citing the Senate Judicia! Proceedings
Committee report on Senate Bill 358).

IV. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND EQUAL
PROTECTION

Rather than'defend the statute, the State in Williams
argued before the Circuit Court for Baltimore City that
the Schochet ruling should not be extended to include
consensual, noncommercial, homosexual activity in the
privacy of the home. 50 Otherwise, the State claimed,
enforcement of section 554 would amount to an
unconstitutional invasion of privacy. 51 The circuit court
agreed, holding that the statute does not apply to
homosexual conduct, just as it does not apply to
heterosexual conduct. 52 In a single paragraph, the court
provides a scant analysis and announced, "[i]t cannot be
doubted, as Defendants concede, that there wouid be an
equal protection violation if acts, considered not criminal
when committed by a heterosexual couple, could be
prosecuted when practiced by a homosexual couple."53
In the tradition of Schochet, the court then construed the
statute so as not to include consensual, noncommercial,
homosexual activity between adults in private. 54 Other
than the court using Schochet 's aphorism "in order to avoid
serious constitutional issues," the court did not cite any
Maryland case law or statute in support of its reasoning. 55
The opinion in Williams suggests that the Equal
Protection Clause would be violated because the Schochet
case recognized a privacy interest in the context of
heterosexual conduct. This is false. Schochet clearly
stated that it was giving section 554 a narrow construction
in order to avoid constitutional questions. 56 The
unreasonable interpretation that Schochet gives to section
554 certainly provides the appearance of clever
constitutional adjudication, yet the court of appeals went

42

so See id. at

*13.

43

See id. at 734, 580 A.2d at 186.

SI

See id. at *13-14.

44

See id.

S2

See id.

4S

[d. at 735,580 A.2d at 187.

S3

See id. at * 13.

46

See Williams, at * 13-14.

S4

See id. at *22.

47

See Schochet, 320 Md. at 725-26,580 A.2d at 181-82.

SS

Id.

48

See id.

49

See Williams, at *14.

S6 See id. at *10. The question remains, however, how there can be
certainty as to the existence of a constitutional issue that has never been
before a Maryland court.

29.2 U. Bait. L.F. 9
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to great lengths to indicate that it was avoiding the privacy
issue. The Schochet decision does not hold that there is a
right to privacy when engaging in consensual,
noncommercial heterosexual conduct in private, rather, the
court in Schochet holds that section 554 does not apply
in this context. 57 Therefore, the Williams court clearly
needed to look beyond Schochet for support of its ruling.

A. The Uncle No One Talks About: Neville v. State
In Neville v. State,58 the Court of Appeals of
Maryland provided guidance that the courts largely ignored
in both Schochet and Williams. The court in Neville found
the defendant guilty ofviolating section 554 for committing
oral sodomy with a woman at an abandoned missile site. 59
The court ofappeals upheld the conviction on the grounds
that the missile site was a public area and, therefore, the
privacy rights ofthe defendant did not attach.60 After
reviewing several United States Supreme Court opinions,
as well as the applicable Maryland cases, the Neville court
determined that "[i]t is clear from the foregoing review
that there is no holding by the Supreme Court that the
right of privacy applies to conduct ofthe type prohibited
by Md. Code, Art. 27 §554."61 If there is no right to
privacy for this type of behavior guaranteed under the
United States Constitution, then such a privacy right must
be found in state law ifit is entitled to the protection ofthe
court.
The defendant in Neville argued that the statute
violated equal protection guarantees because it creates
two classes: (1) a class of married people, whose right to
privacy shields them from prosecution, and (2) a class of
unmarried people, who are subject to prosecution under
section 554. 62 The right to privacy under section 554

would, therefore, attach to one class, but not to the other.63
The court reviewed this argument and held that ifa married
couple was prosecuted under section 554, the marriage
would not be a defense and no other privacy interest
associated with marriage would apply.64 Under this
rationale, it is fair to say that the Court of Appeals of
Maryland would not find a right to privacy associated with
the conduct proscribed by section 554. Ifthis is the case,
then the Williams court is merely hypothesizing when it
says, "[i]t cannot be doubted that there would be an equal
protection violation."65
Further, the Neville court considered whether an
intermediate standard of review applies that requires "a
fair and substantial relation between the statute under
consideration and the legitimate objective of the police
power for which it was enacted."66 According to Neville,
this standard applies where legislation involves important
personal rights that do not merit strict scrutiny review, but
are entitled to more protection than the rational relation
test would afford. 67 The court rejected the standard,
holding that the practices proscribed by section 554 did
not qualify as an "important personal right.''68 Instead, the
court applied the rational relation test, and held section
554 to be a valid exercise of Maryland' s police power in
maintaining a decent society and protecting the public
morality.69 In light of this precedent, it is surprising that a
trial court could find that the sodomy statute would not
survive equal protection analysis.

63

See id. at 382, 430 A.2d at 579.

57

See Schochet, 320 Md. at 735,580 A.2d at IS6

64

See id.

58

290 Md. 364,430 A.2d 570 (1981).

65

Williams, at *13.

59

See id. at 367, 430 A.2d at 572.

66

Neville, 290 Md. at 383, 430 A.2d at 580.

(,7

See id.

("' See id. at 377,430 A.2d at 576-77.
(,I

Id. at 377,430 A.2d at 576.

681d.

62

See id. at 381-82,430 A.2d at 579.

G'J

29.2 U. Bait L.F. 10

See id. at 383-84, 430 A.2d at 580.
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v. THE VALIDITY OF SODOMY LAWS
Having suffered defeat several times on the floor of
the legislature, individuals seeking repeal of the sodomy
laws have soughtreliefin the courts. Such plaintiffs advance
the same policy argwnents that failed in the political process,
and in a case such as Williams, these arguments act as an
invaluable tool to supplement weak legal analysis.
Nevertheless, the courts are willing to listen, and society
is forced to enter an unconstitutional area where the process
ofjudicial legislation occurs.
A. Constitutionality of Sodomy Laws

As noted earlier, the Supreme Court held in Bowers
v. Hardwick70 that there is no federal constitutional right
to engage in sodomy. This opinion has been the subject
of much commentary and criticism as it seemed to
contradict a line of cases considering the right to privacy. 71
For example, in Griswold v. Connecticut,72 the court
stated that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have
penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees
that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees
create zones of privacy. ''73 The Court in Bowers, however,
refused to advance Griswold's "prenumbras" and
"emanations" in the context of state sodomy laws. 74
The continued existence ofBowers was subsequently
threatened by the decision of Romer v. Evans. 75 In
Romer, the Supreme Court held that Amendment 2 ofthe
Colorado State Constitution, which precluded all legislative,
executive, or judicial action at any level of state or local

government designed to protect the status of persons
based on their homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation,
conduct, practices or relationships, violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 76
Bowers, however, remains valid and provides keen insight
into the Griswold line of cases.77 In Bowers, Justice White
meticulously distinguished sodomy from the rights that had
been declared implicit in the "right to privacy," asserting
that the limits ofthis right had been discerned by Careyv.
Population Services International. 78 The Court
reviewed a number of privacy cases79 and concluded that
the "right to privacy," as defmed by these cases, became
relevant only in the contexts of family, marriage, or
procreation. 80 Since there is no connection between
sodomy and the interests of family, marriage, or
procreation, the Court held that the "right to privacy" does
not create a right to engage in homosexual sodomy. 81
Continuing its analysis, the Bowers Court held that
because sodomy is not protected by the Constitution, it
may be validly regulated by the police power ofthe states.82
This police power includes the ability ofthe state to regulate
matters between consenting adults in private, and can be

76

See id. at 635.

77 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (dealing with education and the raising of
children); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (concerning
familial relationships); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rei. Willamson, 316 U.S.
535 (1942) (dealing with procreation); Loving v Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (involving marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 479
(1965) (concerning contraception); Einsenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (discussing abortion).
78

71l

See Bowers, 478 U.S. 186.

See e.g., Michael L. Closen, Symposium on Health Care Policy: What
Lessons Have We Learned From the AIDS Pandemic?, 61 ALB. L. REv.
897 (1998); Mark John Kappelhoff, Bowers v. Hardwick: Is There a
Right to Privacy?, 37 AM. U. L. REv. 487 (1988).

71

381 U.S. 479 (1965)(holding that the Connecticut law forbidding use
of contraceptives unconstitutionally intrudes upon the right of marital
privacy).

72

73

See id. at 484.

74

See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197.

7S

517 U.S. 620 (1996).

431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (finding that the decisions that an individual
may make without unjustified government interference are personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, conception, family
relationships, and child rearing and education).
,
79 See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 510; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 390 (dealing with
education and the raising of children); Prince, 321 U.S. at 158 (concerning
fami lial relationships); Skinner, 3 16 U. S. at 535 (dealing with procreation);
Loving, 388 U.S. at I (involving marriage); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 479
(concerning contraception); Einsenstadt, 405 U.S. at 438; Roe, 410 U.S.
at 113 (discussing abortion).
81l

See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.

81

See id. at 190.

82 See id. at 195-96. See also, Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion
that "[t]his is essentially not a question of personal preferences' but
rather of the legislative authority of the State. I find nothing in the

29.2 U. Bait. L.F. 11
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sufficiently founded on the basis ofmorality. 83 In support
of this statement, the Supreme Court noted that, "[t]he
law, however, is constantly based on notions of morality,
and if all the laws representing moral choices are to be
invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts
would be very busy indeed."84 Urging caution, Bowers
provided a reminder that morality is traditionally within
the state's police power. 85
B. Sodomy Laws and "Public Morality"

The Maryland Court of Appeals in Neville
characterized Article 27, section 554 as a valid exercise
of the state's police power in its protection of the public
morality.86 Critics ofthis justification argue that sodomy
laws are outside of the concern for the public morality
when it is consensual and private. 87 But are sodomy laws
actually "outside the realm ofpublic morality" whenever
sexual conduct occurs in private and with mutual consent?
The answer should be a resounding no. For example, the
following activities are still considered illegal: private,
consensual sex between a man and a sixteen-year-old
girl;88 bestiality in the privacy ofthe Griswoldian bedroom;89

incestuous affairs between adults;90 private possession
and ingestion of illicit drugs;91 private possession of child
pornography;92 and private consensual, homosexual and
heterosexual prostitution. 93 These illustrations94 make it
clear that "public morality" may, and in fact does, include
consensual conduct that occurs in a private setting.
Whenever the state regulates conduct for the sake
of public morality, it is a policy-based determination made
by the legislature that the conduct in question addresses,
thereby affecting, the morality ofthe citizens ofthat state.
It is perfectly valid for the state to make a legislative
decision that reflects a deeper moral choice. 95 Thus, the
concern for the public morality is not limited to

See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 335 (1998) (it is a felony in Maryland to
have carnal knowledge of another person, being within the degrees of
consanguinity within which marriages are prohibited by law).

90

See MD. ANN. CODE art 27, § 286 (1998) (it is unlawful in Maryland to
manufacture, distribute, counterfeit, manufacture a controlled dangerous
substance or possess certain equipment for the purpose of using
controlled dangerous substances).

9\

92

See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252.

See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 15(e) (1998) (it is unlawful in Maryland
to procure or to solicit or to offer to procure or solicit for the purpose
of prostitution, lewdness or assignation).

93

The Court in Bowers also made use of this illustration and concluded:
And ifrespondent's submission is limited to the voluntary
sexual conduct between consenting adults, it would be
difficult, except by fiat, to limit the claimed right to
homosexual conduct while leaving exposed to prosecution
adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes even though they
are committed in the home. Weare unwilling to start down
that road. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195-96.
In Paris Adult Theatre Iv. Sianton, 413 U.S. 49, 68 (1973), the
Court also rejected the idea that conduct between consenting adults is
always beyond state regulation. The Court stated:
Our Constitution establishes a broad range of conditions
on the exercise of power by the states, but for us to say
that our Constitution incorporates the proposition that
conduct involving consenting adults is always beyond state
regulation, is a step we are unable to take.
The Court went on to cite examples such as prostitution, duels,
bigamy, adultery, and fornication. Paris AdultTheatre 1,413 U.S. at 68,
n.15.

94

Constitution depriving a State of the power to enact the statute challenged
here." Id. at 196-97.
83

See id. at 196.

84

Id.

USee id.
86

See Neville, 290 Md. at 383, 430 A.2d at 580.

See Comment, Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the
Context o/Homosexual Activity, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 521, 636 (1986).

87

88

See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 463(3) (1998).

89 This crime, like anal sodomy, is also prohibited by section 554 as an
"unnatural and perverted practice." The Humane Society of the United
States has recently launched a campaign to make sexual abuse of animals
illegal; the group notes that bestiality was previously prosecuted under
the sodomy laws that have since been struck down. See, Barbara
Hagenbaugh, Us. Group Campaigns to Outlaw Animal Sex, RTw (Reuters
World Report), March 16, 1999. See also <http://www.hsus.org>.

29.2 U. Bait L.F. 12

In Paris Adult Theatre I, the Court quoted Roth v. United States, 354
U.S. 476,485 (1957) stating that the state can legitimately act in order to
protect "the social interest in order and morality." Paris Adult Theatre,
413 U.S. at 61. The Court further stated that a law should not be
invalidated simply because it "reflects unprovable assumptions about
what is good for people." Id. at 62.
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nonconsensual conduct or conduct that occurs in public.
"Public momlity" should be construed to mean the momlity
a/the public, not merely morality in public. As noted
above, this power to proscribe conduct is only restrained
by the federal and state constitutions. Accordingly, unless
the conduct is protected by some constitutional right, it
may be validly proscribed by the state's police power.
Moreover, the purpose of the sodomy law is to
encourage moral behaviof16 (i.e., that which is productive,
healthy, or otherwise beneficial for the individual or society)
and to discourage immoral behavior. Even if such moral
behavior is not practiced in private homes, these laws have
the effect of restraining immoral, unhealthy conduct and
preventing its normalization. 97 To invalidate a law, not
because it is unconstitutional, but merely because it reflects
a moral decision on the part ofthe legislature, is to deprive
the states oftheir constitutional right to regulate the conduct
oftheircitizens. 98 To strip the state ofthe moral dimension
of its police power is to render the state helpless in
controlling and confronting conflicts for which its citizens
expect a remedy. Arguing that the state has no interest in
the public morality beyond the public forum necessarily
undermines what has traditionally been delegated to the
states.

proposed that the HIV/ AIDS crisis has a much greater
impact on homosexuals and intravenous drug users. \01 As
a corollary, those who engage in intravenous drug use and
unprotected sex are categorized as "high risk" for
contracting the HIV virus. 102 Ifthe tide ofthis epidemic is
to be turned, then such "high risk" behavior must become
the focal point of our concern.
The most recent statistics available from the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention highlight the need to
control "high-risk" sexual behavior. 103 Homosexual men
represent fifty-seven percent ofthe cumulative total number
of AIDS cases through 1998 in the United States, a far
larger percentage than any other category.104
Furthermore, sodomy, whether heterosexual, homosexual,
or bisexual, inevitably leads to rectal and prostate damage
which may lead to the onset of AIDS, hepatitis B, and
other sexually transmitted diseases. lOS Former Surgeon
General C. Everett Koop has stated that "anal intercourse,
even with a condom, is simply too dangerous a practice."I06

C. Sodomy Laws and Public Health

The Supreme Court has also recognized that a state
may validly exercise its police powers in the interest of
public health. 99 This is especially important in the advent
of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the explosion of other
sexually transmitted diseases. States are struggling to find
a way to reduce the rapid spread of disease, and many
experimental measures have been tried. 100 It has been
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See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192.
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See id.
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See U.S. CONST. amend. X.

See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996)( quoting Hillsborough
County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719
(1985) and Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S.
724,756 (1985)).

101 See United States Congress, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AsSESSMENT, REVIEW
OFTHE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES REsPONSE TO AIDS 6 (WASH., D.C.) (pub.
No. OTA-TM-H-24) (Feb. 1'985).
1112

See id.

1113 CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, HIVIAIDS SURVEILLANCE
REpORT, Midyear Edition, Vol. 10, No.1 (1998).
104 See id. at 12, Table 5. In contrast, heterosexual males represent only
four percent of AIDS cases. ld. If the figures are totaled by race or
ethnicity, the greatest percentage of AIDS cases is again found among
homosexual males. ld. at 16, Table 9. Of males between the ages of
thirteen and nineteen, homosexuals represent thirty percent of the total
number of AIDS cases, while heterosexual males comprise only nine
percent. !d. at 26, Table 18. Between the ages of twenty and twentyfour, homosexual males represent sixty-three percent, while heterosexual
males represent only four percent. ld. Even though the Centers report
that AIDS incidence is declining in all groups, statistics show that
homosexual behavior carries with it a greater risk of infection.

99

100 See Comment, Survey on the Constitutional Right to Privacy in the
Context ofHomosexual Activity, 40 U.MIAMI L.REv. at 631-34.

10, See The Causes ofMale Homosexuality, Why is Homosexuality not a
Normal Sexual Variation?, National Association for Research and

Therapy of Homosexuality.
1116 Celia Hooper, Surgeon General Advises Doctors to Teach Patients
about Condoms, United Press International, Oct. 13, 1987.
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Statutes such as section 554 of the Maryland
Annotated Code, were enacted to prohibit "unnatural or
perverted practices" among all classes ofpeople and serves
to curtail risks that arise as a result of such behavior. It is
clear that controlling this behavior is within the state's
power to regulate conduct for the sake ofthe public health.
In light of the statistics cited, it would be prudent for the
state maintain such a statute.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is the duty of a trial court to apply the law as it is

written to the set of facts to be decided. Considering the
Williams ruling, however, this statement is worth repeating.
Williams relies on the rulings of other state courts that
have interpreted their own state constitutions regarding
the statutes that had been approved by their state
legislatures. Williams also relies on Schochet, a case that
is exceptional for its willful construction of the law and
analysis that similarly ignores its own precedent. It should
be recognized that a constitutional issue in one state is not
necessarily a constitutional issue in every state. A tribunal
does not fulfill its duty merely by pronouncing that other
courts are divided on the issue, and then arbitrarily deciding
whether it is to fall on the "pro" or "con" side.
Lastly, it is well within the state's legislative power to
prohibit conduct that is not constitutionally protected.
States have always had the ability to criminalize conduct
that was considered indecent in order to maintain the
morality of the citizenry. The state's power to regulate
immoral conduct extends not only to public activities, but
to activities engaged within private arenas as well.
Additionally, it has been generally held that the state has a
compelling interest in promoting public health and safety.
Sodomy laws, therefore, come well within the legislative
territory of the states. The fact that the critics of these
laws have failed to persuade the states otherwise is not an
argument against the validity of enacted statutes.
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